Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law
Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 4
Issue 3 1996

Article 3

1996

Allowing States to Avoid Accountability: A Death Knell for Private
Enforcement of Federal Environmental Laws? Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida
Melissa McAllister

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Melissa McAllister, Allowing States to Avoid Accountability: A Death Knell for Private Enforcement of
Federal Environmental Laws? Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 4 Mo. Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 147 (1996)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl/vol4/iss3/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law by an
authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact bassettcw@missouri.edu.

State Sovereign Immunity

Allowing States To Avoid Accountability:
A Death Knell For Private Enforcement Of Federal
Environmental Laws?
SeImole Tribe of Florida v Florida'
by Melissa McAllister

I. INTRODUCTION
The Eleventh Amendment
addresses a fundamental issue in the lives
of all citizens, the power of a private
citizen to sue a state to make it obey the
federal Constitution. For if the citizens
may not sue a state to compel
compliance with federal laws. those
fundamental liberties which we hold dear
may be in jeopardy. This Note will

consent.' This departure from existing
law and its possibly far-reaching impact
on environmental litigation, will be the
focus of this Note. The Court "has
recognized that the general problem of
environmental harm is often not
susceptible to a local solution."' If such
is the case. what does the instant
decision mean for the future of
environmental law?

discuss the recent landmark United

States Supreme Court decision,
Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida
(Seminole Tribe), in which a 5-4 Court
relied on the Eleventh Amendment to

assert that Congress is barred from
authorizing private parties to sue the
states in federal court without the states'

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In September 1991. the
Seminole Tribe of Florida (Seminole)
filed this action against the State of
Florida and its Governor (Florida),
invoking jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(7)(A).

the Indian Gaming

Regulatory Act (IGRA). and 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1362.s Seminole
contended that Florida had violated the
good faith negotiation requirement
contained in § 2710(d)(3) by refusing
to enter into any negotiation for
inclusion of particular gaming activities
in a tribal-state compact.' Florida
moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging
that the suit was violative of the State's
sovereign immunity from suit in federal
court.' The district court denied the
motion.' from which Florida took an
interlocutory appeal.'
The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court's decision, holding that the
Eleventh Amendment barred Seminole's
suit against Florida."o The Eleventh
Circuit agreed with the district court that
in § 2710(d)(7) Congress had clearly
intended to abrogate the States'
sovereign immunity; and that the IGRA
had been passed pursuant to Congress'
power under the Indian Commerce
Clause. However the Eleventh Circuit

' 116 S.Ct. 1114(1996).
2 Id. at 1133. Note, with respect to civil rights suits that derive from Fourteenth Amendment claims, Congress is not barred from authorizing
private parties to sue the states in federal court -withoutthe states' consent. Id. at 1125.
'Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1. 3 (1989)(citing Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978)).
4 Seminole, 116 S.Ct. at 112 1. "The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act provides that an Indian tribe may conduct certain gaming
activities only
in conformance with a valid compact between the Tribe and the State in which the gaming activities are located...The Act, passed under the
Indian Commerce Clause..., imposes upon the States a duty to negotiate in good faith with an Indian tribe toward the formation of a
compact..., and authorizes a Tribe to bring suit in federal court against a State in order to compel performance of that duty..." Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1121. 28 U.S.C. § § 1331 and 1362 grant to the district courts original jurisdiction with respect to those civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, that is federal questions, and original jurisdiction of all civil actions. brought by an
Indian tribe or band with a goveming body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, in any controversy arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States, respectively.
61(/. The facts which led to Seminole's allegations are as follows:
In January 1991, Seminole requested of Florida's Governor "the commencement of negotiations, pursuant to IGRA. for a tribal-state
compact governing the conduct of class III gaming activities on tribal lands. On March 4, 1991, the Tribe submitted a proposed compact
providing for tribal operation of poker. and all
video, electronic and computer-aided games which duplicate poker, bingo. pull-tabs, lotto,
punchboards, tip jars, instant bingo and other games similar to bingo... On May 24. 1991, the Governor's General Counsel responded for
the Governor, rejecting all of the Tribe's proposed games with the exception of poker... [Following requests for reconsideration and the
submission of legal memorandum to Florida, providing support for the proposed compact provisions], [i]n August 1991, the Governor's
General Counsel reasserted that the State would not negotiate regarding any fonn of gaming not expressly allowed by State statutes, nor
would the State negotiate regarding any machine gaming or any forn ofcasino gaming. The State expressed a willingness to negotiate only
poker and other card games, raffles, parimutuel wagering on dog and horse racing. and jai alai. Tribal and State representatives met in
September 1991 , but the State refused to change its position regarding the scope ofthe negotiations."
Brief for Petitioner at 7, 1995 WL 143442.

' Id.
'Id. Motion denied at 801 F.Supp. 655, 655 (S.D.Fla. 1992).
' Id.
loll1 F.3d 1016, 1018 (llth Cir. 1994).
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disagreed with the district court. holding
that under the Indian Commerce Clause,
Congress did not have the power to
abrogate a State's Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit" The Eleventh
Circuit also held that the doctrine of Ex
parte Young'2 does not permit an Indian
tribe to compel good faith negotiation
by bringing a suit against the Governor
of a State." Due to its lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, the appellate court
remanded to the district court with
directions to dismiss Seminole's suit.14
Seminole sought review of the

Eleventh Circuit's decision, and the
United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari." The United States Supreme
Court, in a five-to-four decision
affirming the Eleventh Circuit's
dismissal of petitioner's suit. held (i)
Congress lacked authority under the
Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity and (ii) the doctrine of Ex

parte Young did not apply to suits
against a state official for prospective
injunctive relief to enforce the good faith
bargaining requirement of the IGRA. "

gaming that are not class I gaming or
class 11 gaming,"' including slot
machines. electronic games of chance.

casino games. poker. lotio. and the
like.22 Among other requirements. the

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

IGRA provides that Class Ill gaming

A. The Indian Commerce Clause"

shall be lawful only where it is
"'Aconducted in conformance with a

and the IGRA 8
The Indian Commerce Clause

of the United States Constitution
recognizes that Congress shall have the
power "Itlo regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several
States. and with the Indian tribes." 9

Congress, through its passage of the
IGRA in 1988, pursuant to the Indian
Commerce Clause. sought to provide a
statutory basis for the operation and
regulation of gaming by Indian tribes.2 0

Tribal-State compact entered into by the
Indian tribe and the State under

paragraph (3) that is in effect." 23
"Paragraph (3)" to which § 2710(d)(1)
refers is § 2710(d)(3). which describes
the scope of a Tribal-State compact 24
and recognized judicial enforceability
with respect to the State's obligation to
make good faith negotiations with the
Indian tribe by § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) and
(B3)(i ).2

The IGRA provides for three classes of
The IGRA also sets forth a
gaming on Indian lands. with a different remedial scheme in order to ensure the
regulatory scheme for each class. Class

III gaming. relevant to the instant
decision, is defined as "all forms of

formation of a Tribal-State compact.2 6
Section 271 0(d)(7)(B)(i i) provides that
in any, action brought by a Tribe under

" Id. at 1019.
12 The doctrine ofExpante Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), in certain instances, provides for a lifling ofthe Eleventh Amendment bar,
in order
to allow a suit against a state officer.
" Seninole, 11 F.3d at 1029.
4

Id.

" Seminole, 116 S.Ct. at 1122.
6

Id. at 1133.
U.S. CONsT., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) is codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2701-2721 (1988).
' U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
20
See 25 U.S.C. § 2702.
2 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8).
8

Class I gaming is defined as "social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional fonus of Indian gaining engaged in by
individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations" and such gaining is of the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Indian tribes. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6). Class IIgaming includes bingo. games similar to bingo. nonbanking card gaies not illegal under the
laws of the State, and card games operated in States prior to the passage of the IGRA. See 25 IJ.S.C. § 2703(7). Class 11gaining activities
are primarily left to tribal self-regulation. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(cx3)-(6).
2325 U.S.C. § 271 0(d)(1). To be lawful, Class II gaming must also be authorized by an ordinance or resolution and located in a state that
permits such gaining.
4
1 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3XA). Section 271 0(d)(3) provides in relevant part:
(A) any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which a class l gaining activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted,
shall request the State in which such lands are located to enter into negotiations for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact
governing the conduct of gaming activities. Upon receiving such a request, the State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to
enter into such a compact.
" See 25 U.S.C. §2710(dX7)(AXi) and (BXi). Section 271 0(d)(7)(A)(i) and (B)(i) provides:
(A) The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over(i) any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure ofa State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the
purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact under paragraph (3) or to conduct such negotiations in good faith...
(B)(i) An Indian tribe may initiate a cause of action described in subparagraph (A)(i) onlv alter the close of the 180-day period beginning
on the date on which the Indian tribe requested the State to enter into negotiations under paragraph (3XA).
"See25 U.S.C. § 2710(dX7Xll3Xii)-(vii).
22
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§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(i), the Tribe must
demonstrate that a Tribal-State compact

has not been entered into and that the
State did not respond in good faith to
the Indian tribe's request to negotiate.
at which point the burden of proof shifts
to the State to show that it has
negotiated in good faith." "If the court
finds that the State has failed to
negotiate in good faith with the Indian
tribe to conclude a Tribal-State
compact. [the court is directed tolorder
the State and the Indian tribe to conclude
such a compact within a 60-day
period."2 1 If after the 60-day period. no
compact has been concluded. "the
Indian tribe and the State shall each
submit to a mediator appointed by the
court a proposed compact that
represents their last best offer for a
compact."2 1 The mediator is directed
to choose between the two proposed
compacts. select "the one which best
comports with the terms of [the IGRA]
and any other applicable Federal law and
with the findings and order of the
court."s0 and submit it to the State and
the Indian tribe." If the State consents
to the proposed compact within the 60day period beginning on the date on
which the mediator submits the
proposed compact, said compact is
"treated as a Tribal-State compact
entered into under paragraph (3)."32 If

the State does not consent to the
proposed compact during the 60-day
period described. the mediator is
directed to notify the Secretary of the
Interior,
who
"shall
prescribe...procedures... under which
class III gaming may be conducted on
the Indian lands over which the Indian
tribe has jurisdiction.""
B. An Overview of Eleventh
Amendment Law and State
Sovereign Immunity: The States,
The Courts, and the Constitution
"[Tihe
[Elleventh
[Almendment is one of the
Constitution's most bafing provisions
and. for its importance, one of the least
analyzed."I The text of the Amendment
provides:
The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity.
commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens
of another State. or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State. 5

has long viewed the Eleventh
Amendment as raising a jurisdictional
bar limiting the power of federal courts
to entertain suits by private citizens
against unconsenting states.
Ratified in 1798. the Eleventh
Amendment was proposed and passed
in response to a particular caseChisholm i. Georgia."

To put

Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment
into perspective. one must recall the text
of Article III of the United States
Constitution. under which the judicial
power of the United States extends "to

Controversies.. .between a State and
Citizens of another State.. .and between
a State.. .and foreign States. Citizens or
Article III confers
Subjects."
jurisdiction over disputes involving
diversity, as well as those involving
federal questions."
Chisholm involved statecitizen diversity jurisdiction, as a citizen
of South Carolina brought suit against
the state of Georgia under Article III's
jurisdictional grant over "Controversies
between a State and Citizens of another
State..."40 In Chishohn, the Court held

In numerous decisions. the
Supreme Court has interpreted the
amendment as prohibiting federal courts
from taking jurisdiction over suits
brought in federal court against a state
by private citizens." Indeed. the Court

that this state-citizen diversity clause of
the Constitution vested jurisdiction in

the Supreme Court over a State. as a
defendant, at the suit of a private citizen
of another State." "The Court's
decision in Chishohn provided a chorus

§ 271 0(dX)(7XB)(ii).
§ 2710(dX7)(B)(iii).
29 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7XB)(iv).

2 See 25 U.S.C.
2825U.S.C.

30 Id.

"t See 25 U.S.C. §2710(d)(7)(BX v).
3225 U.S.C. § 2710(dX7XB)(vi).
3

See 25 U.S.C. § 271 0(d)(7)(BXvii).

31

William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpreation ofthe Eleventh .Aniendment: A Consuiction ofinAJhfimatiive Graint ofJurisdiction

Rather Than A Prohibition Against Jurisdiction.. 35

STAN.

L. REv. 1033, 1033 (1983).

CONST. amend. XI.
Fletcher, supra note 34, at 1033 (citing e.g.. "Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors. Inc., 458 US. 670, 682 (1982) (characterizing
the issue before the Court as a "detennination ofiwhether the Eleventh Amendment in fact barred an exercise ofjurisdiction by the federal
court"); Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 91 (1982) (holding that "the Eleventh Amendment bars the statutory interpleader sought"), Edehnan
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (referring to the rule "that a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid
from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment").

"U.S.
36

37

3

2 U.S. 419 (1793).
U.S. CONsT. art. m,

§ 2, cl. 1.
9Fletcher, supra note 34. at 1034.
4
o U.S. CONST. art. M. § 2, cl. 1.
41

Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 420.
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of calls around the country for a
constitutional amendment."4 Thus, the
Eleventh Amendment was created. with
the unquestionable purpose of
countering the majority opinion in
Chishohn and overruling its holding.
However,
[tihe Supreme Court did not
directly address the issues of

whether

the

[Elleventh

[Al mendment forbade private suits
against statesby all private citizens.
out-of-state or in-state, and
whether private suits could be
brought under another head of
jurisdiction, until after the first
general original federal question
jurisdictional statute was adopted
in 1875.11

the acts were illegal. they were merely
the acts of individuals acting without
the amendment intended to bar suits by authority from the state. If the state
in-state citizens, as well." "Hans. or the could
never
authorize
an
general principle prohibiting federal unconstitutional action, the official must
court jurisdiction perceived to lie behind be acting in his or her individual
it."' today generally stands for the capacily.s0 In 1974. the Court clarified
proposition that the Eleventh this doctrine when in Edelman v.
Amendment forbids citizens from suing
/or(ian'
the Court held that the doctrine
states in federal court."
of Ex parte Young permitted suits for
Hans's prohibition against prospective relief but did not permit suits
suing states in federal court was for retroactive relief. "which requires the
considered too broad in a federal system payment of funds from the state
that seeks to control state action through treasun." 2
federal law in order to protect private
Apart from the Exparte Young
individuals. Therefore the Court
fiction. other means exist by which a
developed a set of fictions and state may be sued in federal court. First,
exceptions to avoid 1ansk full effect.
a state may consent to be sued. Such
The most significant of these Court- consent may be recognized in a variety
created fictions is the doctrine of Ex

of state actions."

may abrogate a state's immunity to suit
when it acts pursuant to its powers as
enumerated in the Constitution. In

The Court

parte Yoing. This doctrine. in certain
instances, provides for a lifting of the
Eleventh Amendment bar. in order to
allow a suit against a state officer. In
Young. the Court held that a federal
court could enjoin the Attorney General
of Minnesota from enforcing a state

that if the Eleventh

railroad rate regulation statute. Since

In 1890. nearly a century after
the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment, the Court in Hans v.
Louisiana" held that a Louisiana citizen
could not sue the state of Louisiana in
federal court for a violation of the

federal contracts clause."
reasoned

Amendment barred suits by out-of-state
citizens. it followed that the framers of

Second. Congress

Fitzpatricky.Bitzer 4 the Court held that

§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"
allowed Congress to abrogate the
immunity from suit guaranteed by the
Eleventh Amendment.56 Recently. in

42
4

Akhil Reed Amar, OfSovereigniand Federalisni, 96 YALF I.J. 1425, 1473 (1987).
Fletcher, supranote 34, at 1039 (citing Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.).
4134
U.S. I (1890).

" Fletcher, supra note 34, at 1039 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. I).
46

Hans, 134 U.S. at 15 (1890). The Court stated:

The letter [of the amendment] is appealed to now [to support an argument that the state is liable to suit]... it is an attempt to strain the
Constitution and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was
adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens ofa State to sue their own state in the federal courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens
of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly repelled? Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had
appended to it a proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a State from being stied by its own citizens in cases arising tuider the
Constitution or laws of the United States: can we imagine that it would have been adopted by the States? The supposition that it would is

almost an absurdity on its face. Id.
' Fletcher, supranote 34, at 1040.
Id.

48
4

'

209 U.S. 123 (1908).

50 Id.

5

415 U.S. 651 (1974).

SId. at 677.
s Fletcher, supra note 34, at 1042-1043. "A state's voluntary appearance in court and defense on the merits constitutes consent... A state
also may confer consent, although such statutes are narrowly construed: If the statute does not unambiguously grant consent to federal
courtsuit, a state will be held to have consented to suit only in state court-.. Finally, it is possible that a state may consent by voluntarily
engaging in activity regulated by the federal governnent..." A/.

427 U.S. 445 (1976).
* Section 5 grants Congress the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment "by appropriate legislation." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 5.
"Fitzpairick. 427 U.S. at 445.
4
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Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co.17 the

the Indian Commerce Clause and (ii)

Court upheld congressional abrogation
of the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity through the Interstate
Commerce Clause." Third. while the
Eleventh Amendment protects states. it
provides no such protection to their
subdivisions. Thus. state subdivisions
such as cities, counties, and local school
boards are not immune from suit."
The scope of the Eleventh
Amendment. particularly congressional
power to abrogate the States' sovereign
immunity, was again at issue in the
instant case. The Supreme Court
addressed whether Congress has the
power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity under the Indian Commerce
Clause and whether the doctrine of Ex

whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young

parte Young permits suits against a state
official to enforce the good faith
bargaining requirement of the IGRA."

permits suits against a state's governor
for prospective injunctive relief to
enforce the good faith bargaining
requirement of the IGRA? 62 The
majority which consisted of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia. Kennedy. and
Thomas. answered the first question in
the affirmative and the second question
in the negative. thereby affirming the
Eleventh Circuit's dismissal of
Seminole's suit.6' The Court held: (i)
although Congress. in enacting the
IGRA. clearly intended to abrogate the
States' sovereign immunity. the Indian
Commerce Clause did not grant
Congress that power. and therefore §
2710(d)(7) of the IGRA could not grant
jurisdiction over a state that does not
consent to be sued and (ii) the doctrine
of Ex parte Young may not be used to

IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion'
In the instant case. the
Supreme Court was presented with two
questions: (i) whether the Eleventh
Amendment prevents Congress from
authorizing suits by Indian tribes against
states for prospective injunctive relief to
enforce legislation enacted pursuant to

enforce the good faith bargaining
requirement of § 2710(d)(3) of the
IGRA against a state official.
Seminole's first argument was
that Congress abrogated the States'
immunity from suit. through the IGRA.
The Court first found that the text of §
2710(d)(7) made it "unmistakably clear"
that Congress intended. through the

IGRA. to abrogate the States' sovereign
immunity from suit." Then, in response
to Seminole's suggestion in favor of
finding the power to abrogate because
the IGRA authorizes only prospective
injunctive relief rather than monetary
relief. the Court dismissed as irrelevant
the type of relief sought." The Court
also dismissed as irrelevant Seminole's
contention that the abrogation power
was validly exercised because the IGRA
grants the states authority over gaming
on Indian lands, a power that they would
not otherwise have."
The Court then narrowed its
focus to consider whether the IGRA was
passed pursuant to a constitutional
provision granting Congress the power
to abrogate. 7 The Court noted that
when previously faced with this issue, it
found the authority to abrogate under
only two provisions of the
Constitution.' In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzen6
the Court held that § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment allowed Congress to
abrogate the immunity from suit
guaranteed by the Eleventh
Amendment.70 The Court then
discussed the only other case in which

congressional abrogation of the States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity was
upheld.," Pennslvania u Union Gas

"491 U.S. 1(1989).
58
md
"See Workman v. New York, 179 U.S. 552 (1900); Moor v. County ofAlameda, 411 U.S. 693,717-21(1973); Mount Healthy City School
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274. 280-81 (1977).
"Seminole, 116S.Ct. at 1121.
6' Rehnquist, CJ., delivered the 5-4 opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, J.T.,joined. Id. at 1119.
62

Id. at 1121.

63

C1.
Id. at 1124. The Court, upon examination of the statute's text, concluded, "the numerous references to
the 'State' in the text of §
271 0(d)(7)(B) make it indubitable that Congress intended through the Act to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit." Id.
(emphasis added).
65 Id. The Court recognized, "[i]t would be a novel proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment does
not bar a suit to enjoin the State
64

itself simply because no money judgment is sought." A/. (quoting Corv v. White. 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982)).
'Id. at 1125. The Court cautioned, "[tlhe Eleventh Amendment imnnmunity may not be lifted by Congress unilaterally deciding that it wvill
be replaced by grat of some other authority." Id. (citing, by analogy, Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246-247 (1985)
("[Tihe mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit in federal court.")).
671Id.
68

kC1.
69427 U.S. 445 (1976).
70Seminole, 116 S.Ct. at 1125.
7' I.

at 1126.
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Co.," which involved abrogation

Amendment. Indeed. it had seemed
through Congress's Interstate
fundamental that Congress could
Commerce Clause powers.
not expand the jurisdiction of the
The Court agreed with Florida.
federal courts beyond the bounds
that rather than extend the rationale of
of Article Ill."
the Union Gas plurality to the Indiain
Commerce Clause. "Union Gas should
In sum. upon reconsideration
be reconsidered and overruled."" The of the decision in Union Gas, the Court
Court reasoned that the Court in Union concluded "that none of the policies
Gas had reached its result without a underlying stare decisis require our
rationale agreed upon by a majority of continuing adherence to its holding...
the court.74 The Court stated that. We feel bound to conclude that Union
"[s]ince it was issued, Union Gas has Gas was wvrongly decided and that it
created confusion among the lower should be. and now is. overruled.""7
courts that have sought to understand
Upon consideration of
and apply the deeply fractured Seminole's alternative argument. that its
decision."" The Court then asserted suit against the Governor of Florida
that Union Gas "also deviated sharply could go forward under the doctrine of
from our established federalism Ex parte Young. the Court held the
jurisprudence and essentially eviscerated instant situation to be "sufTiciently
our decision in Hans.""6 The Court different from that giving rise to the
further recognized that:
traditional Ex parte foung action so as
Never before the decision in Union to preclude the availability of that
Gas had we suggested that the doctrine."7 9 The Court reasoned that
bounds of Article III could be although "we often have found federal
expanded by Congress operating jurisdiction over a suit against a state
pursuant to any constitutional official when that suit seeks only
provision other than the Fourteenth prospective injunctive relief in order to

'end a continuing violation of federal
law'."' it could not supplement the
remedial scheme set forth in §
2710(d)(7) with a judicial'ly-created
exception." The Court concluded that
as Congress had chosen to impose a
significantly more limited liability than
that which would be imposed upon a
state officer under Exparie )oung. this
action was a strong indication that
Congress did not wvish to create such
liability under § 2710(d)(3) and the
Court was not free to rewrite the
statutory scheme. 2
Therefore, the Court
concluded that the Eleventh Circuit's
dismissal of Seminole's suit was proper.
The Court held that (i) Congress lacked

authority under the Indian Commerce
Clause to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity and (ii) the
doctrine of Exparte Young did not apply

to suits against a state official for
prospective injunctive relief to enforce
the good faith bargaining requirement

of the IGRA. 3
B. Stevens's Dissent"
Justice Stevens's forceful

72 See supra note 3.
" Sentinole, 116 S.Ct. at 1127.
71

Id. The Court stated,

We have already seen that Justice Brennan's opinlion received the support ofonly three other Justices. Of the other five, Justice White, xvho
provided the fifth vote for the result, wrote separatcly in order to indicate his disagreement with the majority's rationale, and four Justices
joined together in a dissent that rejected the plurality's rationale. Id.
Note that the four dissenters in Union Gas were Scalia. Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy. four of the five-Justice majority in the instant
case.
75 Id.
76Id

"Id. at 1128.
7

1Id. The Court explained:
In overruling Union Gas today, wereconfimn that the background principle ofstate sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment
is not so epheineral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area, like the regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive
control of the Federal Govennent. Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over a particular area.
the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States. Id. at 1129-30.
The Court concluded by dismissing Souter's dissent as, "*in favor of a theory cobbled together from law review articles and its own version
of historical events," among other things. Id.
' 9 Id. at 1132.

0Id.

a Id. The Court stated that, "where

Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily
created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and pennitting an action against a state oilicer based upon E

parte Young." Id.
8' Id. at 1 133.

93 Id.

* Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, acknowledging the thoroughness of the analysis of Justice Souter's dissent, but asserting that the
"shocking character" of the majority's decision was worthy' ofadditional comment. Id. at 1134.
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dissent first asserts. "[tihis case is about
power-the power of the Congress of
the United States to create a private
federal cause of action against a State.
or its Governor. for the violation of a
federal right."" Stevens referred to a
long line of cases. Chisholm.
Fitzpatrick, Union Gas. even Hans. "a
case the Court purports to follow
today." in which the Court recognized
that Congress has such power. He
noted. "[nlevertheless. in a sharp break

with the past, today the Court holds that
with the narrow and illogical exception
of statutes enacted pursuant to the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment., Congress has no such
power." 8 Stevens stressed that the

effect of the majority's decision was not
simply to negate the IGRA. but to
severely limit Congress's ability to

provide private individuals with a
judicial forum in which to confront the
states, with the following:
The importance of the majority's
decision to overrule the Court's
holding in Pennsylvania v Union

Gas Co. cannot be overstated. The
majority's opinion does not simply

preclude
Congress
from
establishing the rather curious
statutory scheme under which
Indian tribes may seek the aid of a
federal court to secure a State's
good faith negotiations over
gaming regulations. Rather, it
prevenits Congress from
n.providing
85

a federal forum for a broad range
of action against States, from those
sounding in copyright and patent
law. to those concerning
bankruptcy. environmental law, and
the regulation of our vast national
economy.87
Further. Stevens found the majority
opinion to be "profoundly misguided".
calling it an "alTront to a coequal branch
of our Government [which] merits
additional comment."a
Stevens then argued that the
text of the Eleventh Amendment does
not apply to federal question cases. but
rather limits its application to diversity

nothing to do with the limit on judicial
power contained in the Eleventh
Amendment." 9' It rests rather on
concerns of federalism and comity that
merit respect but are nevertheless. in
cases such as the one before us,
subordinate to the plenary power of
Congress."
Finally. suggesting that the
"misguided opinion" of the majority is

cases. He emphasized,

C. Souter's Dissent94

".

..oie cannot

one of an advisory character, Justice
Stevens expressed confidence that
"Justice Souter's far wiser and far
more scholarly opinion will surely be

the law one day."9

deduce from either the text of Article
Souter penned a penetrating
III or the plain terms of the Eleventh dissent to counter the majority's
Amendment that the judicial power does decision,
which
he
called
not extend to a congressionally created "fundamentally mistaken."5 Souter
cause of action against a State brought began vith the following assertion:
by one of that State's citizens."89 In
In holding the State of Florida
answer to the majority's assertion that
immune to suit under the Indian
precedent (Hans) compels that same
Gaming Regulatory Act. the Court
conclusion. Stevens disagreed. arguing
today holdsfor the first time since
that Hansmerely held that federal courts
the founding of the Republic that
should decline. as a matter of federal
Congress has no authority to
common law. to entertain suits against
subject a State to the jurisdiction
unconsenting States unless otherwise

of a federal court at the behest of

directed by Congress. 0 Stevens
an individual asserting a federal
pointedly asserted.
right."
The fundamental error that Souter then embarked on a lengthy
continues to lead the Court astray is its historical analysis. which cannot be
failure to acknowledge that its modern adequately summarized within the
embodiment of the ancient doctrine of constraints of this Note.9'
sovereign immunity "has absolutely
First Souter engaged in a

Idat 1133.

86 bl. at 1 34.
87

Id

88

Id.

89

Id at 1137.

90 Id.

h1(1.
at 1142 (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 25 (Stevens, J.. concurring)).
92
3

l.
Id. at 1145.

Souter. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined. A/. at 1119. Note, "In a rare occurrence, Justice David
H. Souter read parts of his dissent from the bench. I written fonn, it ran to 92 pages." David G. Savage, High Court Curbs Federal
Lawsuits .gainst the States, L.A. TIMrEs. March 28, 1996, at 1.
94

9Id. at 1145.
1 hl. (emphasis added).

9 Indeed, Souter's dissent has been described as, ...an extraordinary review of both constitutional history and Supreme Court precedents
with respect to sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Amendment and the Hans decision, and it is worth reading simply as a model of the
persuasive use of legislative (and other) history for constitutional interpretation and not so incidentally - as history of the United States."
Stephen L. Kass and Jean M. McCarroll, PrivateEnforcenentA/ier 'Seminole'. N.Y.L.J.. Apr. 26, 1996, at 3.
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textual analysis" of the Eleventh
Amendment, concluding, "[tihe history
and structure of the Eleventh
Amendment convincingly show that it
reaches only to suits subject to federal
jurisdiction exclusively under the
Citizen-State Diversity Clauses."' Such
a reading of the Eleventh Amendment.
Souter held. comports with the Court's
practice. with the history of the drafting
of the Amendment, and with the
Amendment's language.' Thus. Souter
reasons. "[bjecause the plaintiffs in
today's case are citizens of the State that
they are suing, the Eleventh Amendment
simply does not apply to them. We must
therefore look elsewhere for the source
of that immunity by which the Court says
their suit is barred from a federal

every recent commentator has
concluded."" Souter further criticized
the majority with the following: "It
follows that the Court's further step
today of constitutional izing Hans's rule
against abrogation by Congress
compounds and immensely magnifies
the century-old mistake of Hans itself
and takes its place with other historic
examples of textually untcthered
elevations ofjudicially derived rules to
the status of inviolable constitutional
law."o' While Souter indicated he
would not overrule Hans. as a matter
of stare decisis. he maintained that "an
understanding of its failings. ..will show
how the Court today simply compounds
already serious error in taking Hons the
further step of investing its rule with
court."'
constitutional inviolability against the
Souter
then
looked considered judgment of Congress to
"elsewhere" for the source of that abrogate it."'0
immunity recognized by the CourtNext. in a stem criticism of the
Hans v Louisiana, addressing "the majority's decision, worthy of quotation
mistakes inherent in Hans and.. the error at length. Souter rebuked the Court for
of today's holding.""o Souter first noted its aggressive intervention, stating the
that the Union Gas Court held that the following:
immunity recognized in Hans was
Itis.. remarkable that as we near the
without constitutional status and was
end of this century the Court should
subject to congressional abrogation. yet
choose to open a new constitutional
the instant Court overruled Union Gas
chapter in confining legislative
0 Souter asserted
and held the reverse.o'
judgments on these matters by
that the Hans holding that the principle
resort to textually unwarranted
of sovereign immunity derived from the
common-law rules, for it was just
common law protects a state from
this practice in the century's early
federal question jurisdiction when the
decades that brought this Court to
state is sued by its own citizen was
the nadir of competence that we
simply "wrongly decided, as virtually
identify with Lochner v. New York.

198 U.S. 45. 25 S.Ct. 539. 49 L.Ed.
937 (1905).
It was the defining characteristic of
the Lochner era. and its
characteristic vice. that the Court
treated
the
common-law
background (in those days.
common-law property rights and
contractual autonomy) as
paramount.. while regarding
congressional legislation to
abrogate the common law on these
as
matters
economic
constitutionally suspect... The
majority today, indeed seems to be

going Lochner one better... [in

effect] extending its reach so far as
to declare that the plain text of the
Constitution is subordinate to
judicially discoverable principles
untethered to any written
provision.

0o

Souter then discussed at length the
origin and purpose of the doctrine of Ex
parte Young. asserting that the doctrine
was applicable in the instant case and
that "the case could. and should. readily
be decided on this point alone."

109

Souter noted that adherence to this wellestablished doctrine would have enabled
the Court to avoid altogether the debate
over congressional power to abrogate
state immunity under the Commerce
Clause or the Indian Commerce
Clause."
Souter concluded that absent
application of the doctrine of Ex parte
)oung, he would follow the Union Gas

In a footnote, Souter responded to the majority as follows, "lie majority chides me that the "lengthy analysis of the text of the Eleventh
Amendment is directed at a strawman." But plain text is the Man of Steel in a confrontation with 'background principlc[s and 'postilates
which limit and control'. An argument rooted in the text of a constitutional provision may not be guaranteed of carrying the day, but
insubstantiality is not its failing." Seminole. 116 S.Ct. at 1152.
"Id. at 1150. In a footnote to this statement, Souter contends, "The great weight of scholarly commentan agrees," citing numerous well9

known commentaries. Id.

' Id. at 1151-52.
1o'Id. at 1152.
'o2Id. at 1173.
"oaId. at 1153.
"o Id. In a footnote, Souter referred to the "'reniarkahl[e] consisten[cyl' of scholarship on this point."

1051

at 1159-60.
' Id. at 1176-77.
'06 Id.

l Id. at 1178.
10 Id.
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decision. "in recognizing congressio na I
power under Article I to abrogate Hains
immunity."' In sum."[blecauseneit] [er
text. precedent. nor history supportsi the
majority's abdication of oiur
responsibility to exercise the jurisdicti ion
entrusted to us in Article III," Sou ter
stated he would reverse the judgm ent
of the Eleventh Circuit."
V. COMMENT
As Justice Stevens suggest ed.
this case is about power-the power 'of
judicial review. Here. arguably, tlhe
majority abused its judicial review poAver
to usurp Congress's abrogation pow.'e rs.
The majority defended its decision on
the basis of "our established federali sm
jurisprudence,"" 2 while the diss ent
criticized the Court for its interventi on,
leading to an appearance of
incompetence and. seemingly, a retu irn
to the Lochner era." Quite simply. the
majority got it wrong. To reach its
holding. the majority disregard ed
precedent and engaged in a susp ect
interpretation of the history of soverei gn
immunity. as well as of the history and
the text of the Eleventh Amendme nt.
Further. the majority's effort to dism iss
the precedent of Union Gas i s
unconmincing.
First, the majority recogniz ced
that Congress was unmistakably cl car
in its intent to abrogate the Stat es'
sovereign immunity through §
2710(d)(7) of the IGRA. Indeed. tlie
majority referred to such legislati ye
intent as "indubitable.""' Then. thie

maJority discussed prior cases in which
it found authority for congressional
abrogation under two provisions of the
Constitution.
the
Fourteenth
Amendment and the Interstate
Commerce Clause."' Rather than
recognize that -ftlhere is no principled
basis for finding that congressional
powecr under the Indian Commerce
Clause is less than that conferred bv'the
Interstate Commerce Clause."" 61 as
Seminole argued. the majority made that
argument obsolete by altogether
abandoning its previous holding that the
Interstate Commerce Clause granted
Congress the power to abrogate state
sov'ereign immunity.""
The majority defends its
conclusion that Union Gaswas-wrongly
decided and should be overruled by
dismissing the holding of Union Gasas
merely a plurality decision."' The
majority also reasoned that never before
the decision in Union Gas had the Court
suggested that Congress could abrogate
the states' sovereign imimunity pursuant
to any constitutional provision other
than the Fourteenth Amendment and
that -fuln the five years since it was
decided. Union Gas has proven to be a
solitary departure from established
law"" Yes. Union Gas represented an
extension of congressional abrogation
powers. but the Court's rationale for
retreating from this extension is simply
unconvincing. After all, isn't new,
groundbreaking law always a solitary
departure at first?
What led to this abrupt retreat

by the Court. concerning congressional
power to abrogate stat e's immunity?
Arguably. politics. The makeup of the
Court has changed. Alt he time Union
Gas wias decided. Justi ces Marshall.
Blackmun, Stevens.. Bren nan, and White
formed the plurality-plu s-one. 20 In the
instant case. Justice s Rehnquist,
O'Connor. Scalia, Ken nedy, the four
dissenters in Union Gas. and the newly
added Justice Thoma s formed the
majority.'12 '
Arguably the Court's decision
in the instant case rut is contrary to
"sound reason, history., precedent, and
strikingly
uniform
scholarly
commentary," as Sou ter's dissent
asserts."v The Court has. in effect. given
more freedom to the st ates to violate
individual rights without accountability
Of course,. this poses a problem for
environmental disputes It has been
suggested that "en vironmental
enforcement ... is m ost directly
threatened by Seminole for no other
body of regulatory lawv has relied so
prominently and successifully, on private
parties to monitor and enforce state
compliance
wvith
federal
requiremeints."'"2
What are the results of the
instant decision? Clearly, a federal court
may not order a state t( pay clean-up
costs pursuant to CE'RCLA at the
request of a private par ty, as that was
the holding of Union Gas. which the
instant decision overn uled. Indeed.
citizens are already feel ing the effects
of Seminole Tribe. ast he decision is

'10nh. at 1184.

"' Id. at 1185.
"2 Id. at 1127.
" A. at 1176-77 (Souter, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1124.

"d.
116

"7

at 1125.
li

Id. at 1127.

118 i at

120

1128.

Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 1.

" Seminole, 116 S.Ct. at 1119.
"' See supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
12'Kass and McCarroll, supra note 97, at 3.
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dispute arose when the Coeur d'Alene
Indian Tribe sued Idaho and various
state agencies and officials to quiet title.
asserting its ownership and jurisdiction
Control Act (TSCA); ... and the over Lake Coeur d*Alene. and several
Resource Conservation and Recovery rivers. The U.S. District Court for the
Act (RCRA), that include private District of Idaho dismissed the suit
enforcement and citizen suit provisions because of Eleventh Amendment
allowing private action against states. . considerations and because the court
.failing to comply with federal said the Tribe failed to state a claim to
regulations,""' are directly affected by the property at issue."' The Ninth
the Seminole Tribe decision. Under Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Seminole Tribe, such citizen suits are Eleventh Amendment barred the Coeur
now unconstitutional since Congress d'Alene Tribe's claim against the state.
may not abrogate a state's state agencies. and state officials to quiet
constitutionally protected sovereign title in the reservation. but did not bar
immumty.
claims for injunctive and declaratory
Also significant in the instant relief against state officials for future
decision is the majority's decision to limit violations of federal law.1"0 The issue
the applicability of the Ex parte Young before the Court was whether the
doctrine itself. Recall that the majority presumption of state title removes this
held that suits seeking injunctive relief case from the scope of the Ex porte
from violations of federal rights may Young doctrine. as Idaho argued."'
only use the Exparte Young doctrine as Also. Idaho contended that the
an exception to the Eleventh declaratory relief sought was retroactive
Amendment bar if Congress has not in nature because it essentially attacks
already enacted a "detailed remedial the sovereignty the state held over the
scheme," specifically designed for the land since it came into the union. 12 The
enforcement of those rights.126 Having Cocur d'Alene tribe insists that the relief
recently heard oral arguments in Idaho sought is prospective in nature."' As
v. Coeur d'A lene Tribe."' "the justices one commentator recognized.
have another chance to limit the Young "depending on what the Court does. it
doctrine by narrowing the definition of could put a lot ofcivil rights actions out
prospective reliefavailable to a plaintiff of bounds' by permitting declaratory
against a state."12 1
judgment actions to be characterized as
Coeur dAlene Tribe concerns claims for retroactive relief"3" In any
ownership of a lake in Idaho. The case. the Court could once again
beginning to preclude CERCLA suits
against states."' Othcr environmental
laws. such as "the Clean Air Act: the
Clean Water Act: the Toxic Substances

redefine the parameters of citizen suit
enforcement of federal environmental
laws. as it did in Seminole Tribe.
In the wake of Seminole Tribe.

what options are still available to enforce
environmental laws? Congress could
condition federal grants on the
requirement that states waive their
immunity from private lawsuits in federal
court. Also. federal agencies. such as
the Environmental Protection Agency.
may initiate suits against states for
environmental wrongdoing. or impose
administrative sanctions on states that
fail to comply with environmental
regulations.'" The doctrine of Ex parie
Young allows suits against the
responsible agency official by name
rather than suing the state itself."
VI. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to predict the
long-term effect of the Semninole' 7-ihe
decision with respect to environmental

disputes. One commentattr suggested,
"The decision in Seminole Tribe is
indeed about the power of the federal
courts to enforce federal law against
state government. It is also. however.
about the power of individuals to
vindicate their federally protected rights
in federal court."'" Clearly: the decision
jeopardizes and frustrates the efforts of
citizens to force states to comply with
federal environmental laws. By
embracing states' rights. to the
detriment of individuals' rights. the

"' See Prisco v. New York, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14944, at *45 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 8, 1996) (holding that as the Eleventh Amendment hars
CERCLA suits against a state, according to Seminole, a plaintiffhas no recourse against New York under the federal superfund law for the
actions of state environmental oflicials who allegedly polluted her land for profit under the guise of a "sting" operation.).
"2 Jeffrey Reynolds, Court Ruling Could Afect Environmental Iows, 1996 WL 8981217.
"2 Sentinole. 116 S.Ct. at 1133.
n2 1996 WL 604993 (U.S. Oral Arg.).
..
sRichard C. Reuben, Justices Take the IP', 83 A.B.A.J. 44 (1997).
129 798 F.Supp. 1443 (1992).
"0o42 F.3d 1244 (1994).
''
3

1996 WL 604993 (U.S. Oral Arg.).

1 2 Id.

" Id.
" Reuben, supra note 128, at 44.

'3s42U.S.C. § 9613.
'Of course, the reason why Congress included citizen-suit provisions inmost federal environmental statutes was because governmental
agencies are often reluctant to bring suits against one another, due to a sort of a "don't bite the hand that feeds you" nentalit.
1'

Martin A. Schwartz, The Eleventh Anendnent Decision. N.YL.J.. May 21, 1996, at 3.
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Seminole Trihe decision. seems to sound
a death knell for private enforcement of
federal environmental rights. Thus.
environmentalists would likely identify
with Justice Stevens and hope that
"...the better reasoning in Justice
Souter's far wiser and far more scholarly
opinion will surely be the law one
day."138

"8 Seninole, 116 S.Ct. at 1145.
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